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Abstract— Authentication and authorization are two key 
elements of a software application. In modern day, OAuth 
2.0 framework and OpenID Connect protocol are widely 
adopted standards fulfilling these requirements. These 
protocols are implemented into authorization servers. It is 
common to call these authorization servers as identity 
servers or identity providers since they hold user identity 
information. Applications registered to an identity provider 
can use OpenID Connect to retrieve ID token for 
authentication. Access token obtained along with ID token 
allows the application to consume OAuth 2.0 protected 
resources. In this approach, the client application is bound to 
a single identity provider. If the client needs to consume a 
protected resource from a different domain, which only 
accepts tokens of a defined identity provider, then the client 
must again follow OpenID Connect protocol to obtain new 
tokens. This requires user identity details to be stored in the 
second identity provider as well. This paper proposes an 
extension to OpenID Connect protocol to overcome this 
issue. It proposes a client-centric mechanism to exchange 
identity information as token grants against a trusted 
identity provider. Once a grant is accepted, resulting token 
response contains an access token, which is good enough to 
access protected resources from token issuing identity 
provider’s domain. 
Keywords - Identity and Access Management, 
Authentication, Authorization, OpenID Connect, OAuth 2.0 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past, web users used to have multiple user 
accounts across different websites. To use full privileges, 
these users went through site-specific user registration 
process. This registration included defining a username 
and a password [1]. Site-specific user information 
maintenance is a burden to users. Users tend to forget 
credentials or use the same credentials over multiple sites. 
This created security loop-holes. Development of OAuth, 
introduction of OpenID was a result of researchers, domain 
experts trying to solve this problem [1].   
OAuth 2.0 framework defines how to delegate access 
to a third party by a resource owner [2]. If requires, this 
framework defines the mechanism to be used by a client 
application to authorize itself to access a protected 
resource [2]. Separation of authorization layer from client 
applications enables them to support multiple authorization 
domains, which support the OAuth framework. Also, with 
this approach, end user credentials are exposed only to the 
authorization server. This enables a single user account to 
be used with multiple services, without the risk of 
credential exposure to untrusted parties [2] [3]. 
OpenID Connect extends OAuth 2.0 framework by 
adding authentication capability [4]. Authentication of 
OpenID Connect is built on top of ID token [4]. ID token 
is represented as a JSON Web Token (JWT) [5] and 
contains details (claims) about the user who authenticate in 
the OAuth 2.0 request [4]. Since OpenID Connect is built 
on OAuth 2.0, the token response contains OAuth 2.0 
tokens along with ID token. This makes OpenID Connect a 
protocol that supports both authentication and 
authorization [4] [6]. 
Today OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect are being 
widely adopted by various technology platforms. For 
example, Internet of Things (IoT) is a trending topic in 
software industry. According to Gartner hype cycle of 
emerging technologies, as of 2017, IoT is at the peak of 
inflated expectations [7]. Same source highlights that IoT 
will be in plateau of productivity within next two to five 
years. IoT will increase the number of connected devices 
and at the same time, there will be the requirement to 
provide authentication and authorization for these devices. 
There are OAuth 2.0 based authorization models suggested 
for cloud computing [8]. Also, there is research done to 
identify the performance of OpenID Connect for IoT 
framework [9] which conclude OpenID Connect as a 
suitable candidate for IoT platforms. There are researches 
done to identify the suitability of OAuth 2.0 and OpenID 
Connect in cloud computing [10], [11]. These researches 
suggest that OpenID Connect will be a key element in 
future IoT applications. 
As these protocols get widely adopted, it is predictable 
to see more and more deployments of identity providers 
supporting these protocols. With the surge of deployment 
of identity providers, it is foreseeable to see the need of 
inter-identity provide communication. Requirements will 
arise to consume services protected by different identity 
domains. This paper suggests a solution for this by 
introducing trust-based identity information sharing 
between identity providers. Sharing of identity details will 
enable identity provider to issue access token which can be 
used by applications to consume protected resources. Rest 
of the paper explains concepts surrounding this idea. It will 
formally introduce the trust model and present how this 
can be done on top of OpenID Connect.  
II. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS WORK 
A. OAuth 2.0 in brief 
OAuth 2.0 is an Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) standard which is identified by RFC6749 [6]. The 
initial version (the predecessor) OAuth is identified by 
RFC5849 [12]. OAuth 2.0 is defined for HTTP based 
communications and built based on JSON standard. A key 
highlight of this protocol is the out of the box support for 
mobile applications. There are few key roles involved in 
OAuth 2.0 framework. “Table I” introduces and explain 
these roles 
 
TABLE I.  ROLES AND DESCRIPTIONS 
Role Description 
Resource 
owner 
An entity with permission to access 
protected resource/service. Also 
identified as an end user when this is a 
human user. 
Resource 
server 
A server which contains protected 
resources. Resource server can consume, 
and grant access based on OAuth 2.0 
access tokens. 
Client 
A client is the application which accesses 
resources from resource server on behalf 
of the resource owner. It can be a 
browser-based application, native 
application (ex: - mobile application) or 
a server application. 
Authorization 
server 
The server responsible for authenticating 
resource owner. It issues OAuth 2.0 
tokens for successful authorization 
requests. 
 
According to OAuth 2.0 specification, resource server 
and authorization server can reside in the same server. 
They can also reside in different domains [6]. Also, it is 
common to call authorization server with names like 
identity provider, identity server. Due to this fact, this 
paper will use these names interchangeably.  
 The specification defines different authorization grant 
types to obtain tokens from authorization server [6]. This 
paper mainly focuses on resource owner involved grant 
types. Following are the grant types applicable in this 
category, 
• Authorization code grant 
• Implicit grant 
• Resource owner password credential grant 
Successful completion of a grant will result in a token 
response. A token response contains an access token. Also, 
depending on grant type, the response could include a 
refresh token which can be used to renew access tokens 
when they expire. Once the client obtains an access token, 
it can use it to access resources from the resource server 
[6]. The way to use the access token in a HTTP request is 
defined by RFC6750 [13]. Also, once a protected resource 
receives an access token, it can use the token introspection 
endpoint of the authorization server to validate it. This 
endpoint and validation process is defined by RFC7662 
[14]. 
B. OpenID Connect in brief 
OpenID Connect brings an authentication layer to 
OAuth 2.0 through the introduction of JWT based ID token 
[4]. Client obtains ID token by completing a token 
obtaining flow defined by the protocol. These flows 
resemble to grant types defined by OAuth 2.0. An OpenID 
Connect flow contains additional request parameters such 
as mandatory scope value of openid in authorization 
request [4]. Also, the response_type query parameter will 
be used to differentiate flow type.  Following are the flows 
defined by OpenID Connect protocol, 
• Authorization code flow 
• Implicit flow 
• Hybrid flow 
Successful token response from an OpenID Connect 
flow will contain the ID token. ID token conveys 
information about token validity as well as authenticated 
end user at authorization server [4]. Client can validate this 
ID token against protocol defined steps. The validity of the 
token will allow the client to authenticate the end user. 
Claims about end user can be used to desired 
functionalities such as customizations and welcome 
messages. Other than the ID token, an OpenID Connect 
token response can contain an access token. Usage of this 
access token is similar as if it was obtained through OAuth 
2.0 grant type. 
C. Trust between roles 
“Fig.1" highlight the trust relationships already present 
among OAuth 2 roles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in “Fig. 1”, the resource owner trusts the 
client (A). Resource owner lets the client access protected 
resources on top of this trust relationship. On the other 
hand, the client and authorization server have a trust 
relationship (B). The specification defines this to be 
established through a registration process [6]. Once token 
obtaining process is done, the client can consume 
resources from the resources server (C). Trust between 
resource server and the client is established through OAuth 
2.0 tokens. Also, resource server may use other terms to 
govern this trust through means such as firewalls, VPNs or 
IP filtering. For example, resource server may only allow 
requests from a specific IP range to access resources even 
if the request contains an access token. But these are out of 
the scope of OAuth 2.0 framework and this paper. 
Since OpenID Connect is built on OAuth 2.0, this trust 
relationship is present in OpenID Connect as well. The 
addition is the ID token which conveys end user claims 
(along with claims needed for token validation) which are 
used to authenticate the end user. ID token helps to build a 
two-way trust relationship between the resource owner and 
the client 
D. Previous work 
Most of the existing work in OAuth 2.0 and OpenID 
Connect focuses on applicability, performance and security 
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Fig. 1.  Trust among OAuth 2.0 roles 
concerns of the respective protocols. This is evident from 
referenced literature such as [2] [3] [8] [9] [10]. There are 
standards such as SAML which supports the concept of 
identity federation [15] [16]. Identity fedaration works 
similar to proposed solution of this paper. 
Trust Requirements in Identity Federation Topologies 
[15] describe how identity federation works and how trust 
models are established in it. As it shows, identity 
federation allows user identities to accept across different 
organizational boundaries. This is done through assertions 
given by trusted parties. Once assertion is accepted, 
protected resources can be accessed across domains [15] 
[16]. As shown by the same sources, identity federation 
concept is present in SAML and WS-Federation, which are 
standards that existed prior to OAuth 2.0 and OpenID 
Connect. But the proposed work of this paper is built on 
top of OpenID Connect which can be considered as a 
successor to earlier mentioned standards.  
Cloud Federation Management and Beyond: 
Requirements, Relevant Standards, and Gaps [16] discuss 
the impact of identity federation on cloud computing. As it 
highlights, cloud deployment strategies greatly benefit 
from identity federation. It highlights the importance of 
well-governed trust establishment process, monitoring and 
auditing related to identity federation. This is a critical 
input for proposed work by this paper. 
 RFC7521 defines an assertion framework to extend 
grant types for OAuth 2.0 [17]. This framework defines 
how assertions from another system can be used by a client 
to obtain access tokens. Token grant defined by this paper 
have a similarity with such assertion mechanism. But 
unlike trying to be a framework, this paper present the trust 
establishment process, token obtaining process and token 
grant validation mechanism thus being a complete 
solution. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Involved roles & trust establishment 
There are four primary roles involved in the problem 
domain. Explaining these roles helps to identify the 
problem in depth as well as establish how trust 
establishment should work in the proposed solution. 
“Table II” introduces these roles and explains their 
involvement. 
TABLE II.  PRIMARY ROLES INVOLVED IN THE PROBLEM DOMAIN 
Role Description 
Client 
An application that represents users. It 
requires end-user authentication, hence 
uses OpenID Connect. Also, there is the 
need for this client to consume services 
in two domains identified as domain A 
and domain B 
Identity 
provider A 
This identity provider governs identities 
in domain A. It issues OAuth 2.0 tokens 
that are trusted and accepted by 
protected services in domain A 
Identity 
provider B 
This identity provider governs identities 
in domain B. It issues OAuth 2.0 tokens 
that are trusted and accepted by 
protected services in domain B 
End user 
A human user who only have identity 
details registered in domain A. He/she 
uses the client and consume resources in 
domain A. But there is requirement of 
this user to access protected resources in 
domain B through the client 
 
Other than these four primary roles, there will be the 
involvement of resource serves. They reside inside above 
mentioned domains and only accepts OAuth 2.0 tokens 
issued by the domain governing identity provider. As 
previously mentioned, these resource servers could use 
token introspection or other valid mechanisms for token 
validation. 
“Fig. 2” shows how primary and secondary roles are 
involved in a problem scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As highlighted in the “Fig. 2”, the end user, the client 
and roles in domain A have a trust relationship similar to 
what is shown and explained by “Fig. 1”. This allows the 
client to complete an OpenID Connect flow and obtain 
access tokens and ID tokens. And it can use obtained 
access tokens to consume a protected resource from 
domain A. But there is no trust relationship among client, 
domain A and domain B. Because of this, client cannot 
obtain tokens from the identity provider in domain B. 
Hence it cannot consume protected resources in domain B. 
The solution for this is to first establish a trust 
relationship among primary roles. First, the client must be 
trusted by identity providers in both domains. This trust 
relationship allows client to obtain tokens to authenticate 
Fig. 2.  Primary and secondary roles in a problematic scenario 
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against any identity provider. Also, the identity provider in 
domain A must trust identity provider in domain B. 
Similarly, identity provider in domain B must trust identity 
provider in domain A. Trust among identity providers 
allow them to issue tokens for each other. Once the client 
obtains such token, client can use that token as token 
grants against identity provider. This token must contain 
identity details of the end user. These details are required 
for monitoring and auditing purposes. Validity of this 
token grant will issue OAuth 2.0 access token to the client. 
This access token cab be used to consume resources from 
the domain. This is the basis for proposed extension by this 
paper. As previously described, sharing of identity 
information is essential for the token validation. This 
justifies the choice of OpenID Connect rather than OAuth 
2.0, which focuses only on the authorization. 
Establishment of trust could be done in several ways. 
Trust among client and identity providers can be 
established through a registration process. Another 
approach is to use OpenID Connect dynamic client 
registration protocol [18]. Trust between identity providers 
can be establish through a registration process. But unlike 
client registrations, there must be strict policies and 
validations that must be followed in the process. “Fig 3” 
formally presents trust relationships in the proposed 
solution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Trust relationships in the proposed solution 
 
Following list further explains the trust relationships 
shown in “Fig. 3”. 
• A – Trust between end user and client. This trust is 
similar to that exists in OAuth 2.0 and OpenID 
Connect 
• B – Trust between identity providers in domain A 
and domain B 
• C – Trust between client and identity provider of 
domain A 
• D – Trust between client and identity provider of 
domain B 
Also, resource servers will have a trust relationship 
with the identity provider in the domain. This trust enables 
clients to consume resource servers with tokens issued by 
domain governing identity provider. 
B. Identity share token 
Authors propose to use a JWT token to share identity 
information. JWT is standardized through RFC7519 [5]. 
Using such established standard benefits adaptability and 
maintainability of the proposed extension. Furthermore, 
OpenID Connect already defines user claims that can be 
included in an ID token. Identity share token can utilize the 
same user claims defined by OpenID Connect 
specification. Other than user related claims, identity share 
token will need to contain claims that are mandatory for 
token validation and trust establishment. “Table III” 
contains such claims that authors proposed to have in the 
token. Adaptations may include other claims that are not 
mentioned there. 
 
TABLE III MANDATORY CLAIMS IN IDENTITY SHARE TOKEN 
 
Claim Description 
iss 
Stands for issuer. This claim must 
contain an identifier unique to the 
identity share token issuing identity 
provider 
aud 
Stands for audience. This claim contains 
an identifier unique to the token 
receiving identity provider. Could be a 
single value or a JSON array 
sdata 
Stands for subject data. This is a JSON 
object. Authors propose user claims to 
be included in this JSON object. This 
claim can be encrypted upon agreements 
between identity providers. This 
prevents leakage of information to client 
application 
exp 
Stands for expiration. Contains the token 
expiration timestamp 
iat 
Stands for issued at. Contains the 
timestamp when the token was created  
 
Also, the identity sharing JWT token can be signed or 
encrypted. Choice of this need to be decided at the trust 
establishment stage. But if client requires token to be 
inspected, for example to validate the audience, then 
authors propose to use signed tokens. In such case, sdata 
claim can be encrypted to disallow clients from obtaining 
sensitive user claims which must only be exposed to token 
receiving identity provider.  
“Fig.4” gives a sample representation of claims 
included in identity share token. 
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C. Token obtaining process 
Identity share token obtaining is built into usual 
OpenID Connect flow. To obtain an identity share token, 
client insert scope value identity_share in the OpenID 
connect authentication request. This scope value is 
mandatory for the proposed extension. Other than that, 
authorization request can contain an additional query 
parameter named identity_share_target which if present 
will contain an identifier of the identity provider which 
identity share token intended to. 
Upon receiving the authentication request, the token 
issuing identity provider must follow all validations 
defined by OpenID Connect specification. If request 
contains identity_share scope, then identity provider 
should prepare the identity share token. If query parameter 
identity_share_target is present, the identity provider must 
verify that the requested target exists in a trusted identity 
provider list. If the target is present, then aud claim of the 
identity share token must be set to the same target value. 
“Fig.5” shows an example authentication request targeting 
token issuing identity provider. It uses authorization code 
flow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Authentication request with identity share token   extension 
  
 This token obtaining process can be used with any flow 
defined by OpenID Connect protocol. Once a flow is 
completed, the token response must contain the identity 
share token with a response parameter named 
identity_share_token along with other requested tokens. 
D. Identity share token as token grants 
Once the client obtains identity share token, next step is 
to use the token as token grants against an identity 
provider. This grant is defined as identity share token 
grant. Hence it uses a JWT token, it is similar to RFC7523 
[19], a profile built on top of assertion framework defined 
by RFC7521 [17]. RFC7523 defines how JWT tokens can 
be used as client authentication or authorization grants. 
The proposed solution of this paper adopts JWT token 
validation process from RFC7523 but defines its own 
token request format. 
The token grant request must define grant_type as 
identity_share_token. Identity share token is sent with a 
parameter named shared_token. Other than these 
parameters, the token request must contain parameters 
relevant to client authentication. Client credentials used for 
authentication are the ones issued by identity share token 
consuming identity provider. “Fig.6” shows an example 
token request with identity share token. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Token request visualized 
 
Once identity provider receives a token request, it starts 
the token request validation process. First it validates 
client_id against known clients. If present and as required 
by client type, client secrets must be validated. Then 
identity provider validates grant type to be exactly matched 
with value identity_share_token. If grant type is different, 
it could be a different grant type. Then request must be 
validated to contain shared_token parameter. If present, 
content must be identified as a JWT. If the shared token is 
not present, an error response must be sent with error code 
invalid_grant_token. Then identity provider proceeds to 
token validation. 
Token validation closely follows RFC7523 JWT 
validation process. First, the identity provider validates iss 
(issuer) claim. Value of this claim must be equal to one of 
the trusted identity provider. Then aud (audience) claim is 
taken and compared to self-identifier. Claim values iat 
(issued at) and exp (expiration) are verified against system 
clock. Then identity provider must validate JWT token’s 
integrity. As defined by RFC7519, this could be a 
signature validation, a decryption or both. Next step is to 
obtain sdata (subject data) claim. Depending on trust 
establishment, value can be encrypted or a plain JSON 
object. The correct extraction method is detected against 
validated issuer profile configurations. Once value is 
obtained, the identity provider will check user claims to 
contain mandatory claims (ex: - subject, email, age etc.).  
The identity provider can solely depend on JWT’s 
integrity to trust user claims present in the token. But 
further verifications can be done through protocols such as 
System for Cross-domain Identity Management (SCIM) 
[20]. SCIM protocol defines how to retrieve identity data 
using known identifiers. This known identifier can the 
subject claim found in subject data. Such validations 
further strengthen the trust relationship among identity 
providers. Once claim validation is done, the identity 
provider may choose to provision the end user temporarily 
or permanently for monitoring and auditing purpose. 
  After a successful token request validation, identity 
provider will issue a token response containing an access 
token. This access token should be similar to one obtain 
authorization?
response_type=code
&client_id=jdf0Plm_op
&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fsample.com%2Fredirect%2F
&scope=openid%20identity_share
&identity_share_target=http%3A%2F%2Domain_B.com/idp
&state=pTl987HmQ
&nonce=12_90oPls
 
POST /token-endpoint HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=identity_share_token
&shared_token=ertIu87[...omitted for brevity...]
&client_id=8UyfGho2pLqCmNb
&client_secret=uTbC67PqAmbrS1Mx9j2
 
Fig. 4.  Identity share token’s mandatory claims 
{
“iss”: “https://Domain_A/idp”,
“aud”: “https://Domain_B/idp”,
“iat”: 1532683271,
“exp”: 1532682999,
“sdata”: {
“subject”: “user1”, 
“email” : “sample@sample.com”
}
}
 
through OAuth 2.0 grant or OpenID Connect flow. Token 
receiving client should be able to consume OAuth 2.0 
protected resources using this token. Identity provider may 
issue a refresh token with the token response to refresh the 
access token. Token response completes the solution 
proposed by this paper. “Fig. 7” shows a summary of steps 
involved in the complete process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Summary of steps 
1) Client initiates the flow by requesting tokens from 
domain A. 2) Once the request is validated, identity 
provider in domain A issue tokens which include identity 
share token. 3) Client makes a token request to the identity 
provider in domain B with identity share grant. 4) Identity 
provider in domain B perform request validations which 
could include validations against domain B. 5) Identity 
provider in domain B response to the token request which 
include an OAuth 2.0 access token. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper proposes a mechanism to obtain OAuth 2.0 
tokens through trust-based identity sharing. It defines trust 
boundaries and proposes trust establishment methods 
between involved entities. It defines the token format and 
contents of it. Then it defines the process of obtaining the 
token, which is built on top of OpenID Connect. Finally, it 
defines the token request format and token request 
validation process. 
Proposed work should enable client applications to 
operate against multiple identity providers. This work is 
mostly based on existing standards such as OAuth 2.0, 
OpenID Connect, JWT and optionally SCIM. Usage of 
such standards enhance adoptability of proposed work into 
existing systems. 
As future work, proposed work must be publicly 
reviewed by domain experts. There will be many 
improvements that can be done to the proposed solution. 
For example, security and privacy issues related to 
proposed mechanism must be identified and rectified. 
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